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And The Medical Expert
Samuel R. Gerber, M.D.
IN ORDER TO achieve better understanding between the medical and
legal professions, it is necessary that there be complete frankness and open
discussion of those factors which have provoked misunderstanding and
grievances. The subject is here approached from a psychological view-
point. There will be no attempt to outline a formula by which judges and
juries should be governed in evaluating testimony of the medical expert;
nor are there definite suggestions concerning the line of questioning the
attorney should follow.
Legal decisions can be
THE AUTHOR (M.D., 1922, L.LB., 1949) is just only when all of the
Coroner of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and Secre- facts are presented to and
tary of both the Ohio State Coroners Associa-
tion and the National Coroners Association. thoroughly understood by
the court and jury. When
a case involves questions
requiring specialized knowledge, it should be mandatory that testimony be
offered by those familiar with the subject under consideration. To provide
the court with this necessary information the law permits specialists qualified
as experts not only to testify as to the facts under consideration but also to
offer opinions on hypothetical questions. It is the expert witness who is called
upon to give opinion evidence.' Expert witnesses are those who are skilled
in any science, art, trade or occupation and are defined as: "Persons qualified
to speak authoritatively by reason of their special training, skill, or familiar-
ity with the subject."
Under modern court procedures there are two factors which tend to
thwart full and completely objective testimony by the expert witness. One
factor is that at the present time in this country each litigant engages one or
more experts to support his side of the question and to attempt to impress
the judge and jury with the correctness of his stand, disregarding ob-
jectivity.. If the expert were chosen by the court or a commision were set
up for the purpose, it would obviate the natural feeling that the expert is,
one might say, on one team. Such sentiment often leads to an unconscious
' "Opinion Evidence" is defined as "Evidence of what the witness thinks, believes,
or infers in regard to facts in dispute, as distinguished from his personal knowledge
of the facts themselves." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1244 (4th ed. 1951).
'Id. at 688.
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bias or mental block on the part of the expert who dislikes to "let down" the
side who engaged him.
The second factor thwarting objectivity is the process of eliciting all
information by a technique of questions and answers designed to prove a
preconceived conclusion of the questioner. The court would be better in-
formed and the opinions more accurate if the scientific testimony were to be
presented in the form of discourse with the obscure and debatable opinions
clarified by answers to direct questioning.
HSTORY
So intimately is forensic medicine associated with the social develop-
ment of man, and particularly with the recognition and punishment of crime,
that it is difficult to trace its early development. In early Egyptian history
there are few allusions to the part played by physicians in the detection of
crime, but there appears to be no doubt that there was definite knowledge
of poisons. Biblical laws made a distinction between mortal and dangerous
wounds and contained provisions relating to virginity, marriage, adultery
and other subjects of public medicine.
In early Greek history there are certain references -to hygiene and state
medicine scattered throughout the writings attributed to Hippocrates, in-
cluding some speculation on the nature and growth of the infant and on
the period of pregnancy. Medical men were consulted by magistrates most
frequently on questions of public health, and there is some evidence that
they were summoned to testify in courts of justice.
The laws of ancient Rome had their chief source and inspiration from
those of Greece and were similar to them, but they embraced more im-
portant medicolegal problems. In the reign of Numa Pompilius, six
hundred years before the Christian era, it was enacted that the bodies of
all women who died during the last months of pregnancy should be opened
so that the infant might be saved if possible. The first Caesar was reputedly
brought into the world by incision of the abdomen, hence the term "Caesare-
an" operation. It was also enacted in the Twelve Tables that the infant in
the mother's womb was to be considered as living and that all civil rights
were to be secured to it. Legitimacy of an infant was limited to those whose
birth occurred within ten months of the death or absence of the putative
father.
It is recorded by Suetonius that the bloody remains of Julius Caesar
when exposed to public view were examined by a physician named Antis-
tus, who declared that out of twenty-three wounds inflicted only one, which
perforated the thorax, was mortal.
It does not appear that there was any positive law which required the
inspection of wounded bodies by a medical practitioner or that legislators
required medical opinion before making laws. It is, however, recorded that
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by the beginning of the empire, midwives were ordered by the praetors to
examine pregnant women in judicial inquiries.
The origin of the connection between the sciences of law and medicine
may be dated from the publication of the Institutes of Justinian (529-533
A.D.), which required the opinion of physicians in certain cases. The
modern beginnings of forensic medicine may be said to originate in 1507,
when the bishop of Bamberg drew up a penal code in which the services
of medical men were to be utilized in all cases of violent deaths, a provision
adopted almost immediately in Bayreuth, Anspach and Brandenburg. The
other states of Germany resisted, but eventually Charles V in the Diet of
Ratisbon in 1532 in the Constituto Carolina required evidence of medical
men in all cases where their testimony could enlighten the judge or assist the
investigation in such cases as personal injury, murder and pretended preg-
nancy. This can be considered as the date of the origin of recognition of
the expert witness.
Italy was one of the early leaders in the development of forensic
medicine. In 1602 an early work in the literature of this field appeared
in Sicily by Fortunatus Fidelis.3
During the medieval centuries and later, numerous cities had physicians
in their service as health officers. Under given circumstances these physi-
cians also had to render expert opinion in the courts about medical ques-
tons, even if they concerned only the trial of a witch.4
DIVERGENT PHILOSOPHIES OF LAW AND MEDICINE
Webster's dictionary states: " Experts may be employed in legal
proceedings as witnesses on matters to which ordinary observers could not
without their aid form just conclusions." The expert witness does not
always fulfill these objectives. Then, wherein does the fault lie? Most of
it can be attributed to a lack of understanding on the part of the expert
witness concerning the motivating principles of legal procedures and a
lack of understanding on the part of the lawyer concerning the duties,
capacities and limitations of the field of knowledge of the expert witness.
Although this is generally true in respect to all expert witnesses in the field
of sciences, it is perhaps more pronounced in regard to expert medical
testimony. This is regrettable since justice is dependent to some extent
on medical evidence in about one-half of the cases brought to appellate
courts in the United States. Certain cities have found that frank discusssions
leading to mutual understanding of the objectives and limitations of the
court and of the problems, philosophies and scope of knowledge of the ex-
a10 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 274-278 (1937)
4215 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 826 (1936)
" WEBSTER's NEW INT'L DIcTIONARY 897 (2d ed. 1935).
[Winter
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pert witnesses have aided effectively the administration of justice and fos-
tered reciprocal respect between the medical and legal professions.
It would be best to consider first what the underlying factors are which
have resulted in alienating the mutual respect of the legal and medical pro-
fessions regarding the processes which lead to just decisions. It would
seem that the fundamental problem lies in correlating two divergent phi-
losophies and, one might say, diatheses, which are the result of the vast dif-
ferences in education and experience of the two professions. The physician
is continually confronted with emergencies in which he must evaluate the
situation for himself and make his own decisions, with only God and his
conscience to review them. It is not true that physicians do not criticize
each other and argue the wisdom of decisions; they do so, however, only
among themselves because each knows that he too is vulnerable and that
he also might be in the same position some day. On the other hand, the
attorney is not faced with the urgency of immediate decisions in the
emergency of life and death. He knows that his conclusions are not defini-
tive but must be debated publicly by other members of his profession as
adversaries. Therefore he is trained to expect his judgment to be questioned
and feels no personal affront when the court rules that his reasoning is not
in the best interests of justice. On the other hand, the physician, because
of his personal relationship to his patient, feels that any doubt cast upon
the expediency of his decisions constitutes a reflection upon his reputation
and will undermine the confidence of the people, not only in himself but
in the medical profession as a whole. So one often finds lawyers ridiculing
each other and each other's witnesses. Doctors do not; they may differ,
but they will not belittle each other. They may go into court separately,
but they come out together, arm in arm and with the utmost respect for each
other.
Due to this divergence in philosophies the attorney is often confronted
with the problem of the medical expert who is apprehensive and antago-
nistic in cross-examination. In his own conscience the physician may know
that his rationale may be open to question, but his training has been to main-
rain an appearance of self-reliance; therefore, he may defend his stand all
the more vehemently.
The cross-examiner is affected by this. His natural course is to phrase
his question in such a manner that it will be revealed to the court that
other conclusions might have been reached by someone else of equal train-
ing and experience. In the best interest of justice, honest divergence of
opinion in regard to diagnoses should be recognized, but the physician
should not be subjected to implied attacks on his ability, skill and reputation.
COMPETENCY
One of the criticisms of medical expert witnesses most frequently heard
19541
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is that of competency. There are many factors involved here. Many be-
lieve that to be a competent medical expert witness one must be a specialist
in the field of medicine involved. For example, they feel only a roentgen-
ologist should testify on x-ray findings, an orthopedic surgeon on treatment
of fractures, and so on. Others believe that a general practitioner has a
more practical, comprehensive knowledge and is more objective in evalua-
tions. There can be no set rules for qualifications of the expert witness.
The complexity of the questions involved should determine whether or not
a specialist should be called to testify. This is a decision that is entirely up
to the trial court to decide. In the case of Shuffield v. Taylor,6 the patient-
plaintiff, a minor 19 years old, sued a physician, claiming among other
things that in performing a tonsillectomy some 15 years before, the physician
removed the patient's uvula, palate and tonsillar pillars, causing loss of
speech. The trial court gave judgment for the patient, but the Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas reversed the judgment on the ground that the trial
court erred in permitting the parents of the patient to testify that subse-
quent to the tonsillectomy the patient had no apparent disease of his mouth
or throat and no disease of the head and ears. In the opinion of the Court
of Civil Appeals the absence of such disease could be proved only by expert
testimony and not by testimony of the non-expert parents. The patient
appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas, which adopted the opinion that the
testimony of the parents was admissible. The testimony did not come
within .the rules relating to expert testimony; it was a statement of fact to
which the parents were competent to testify. The opinion of a lay witness
who is familiar with a person is admissible concerning the state of that
person's general health, strength and bodily vigor, his feebleness or apparent
illness or his change in physical condition from one time to another. The
parents were not called upon to make a diagnosis but to give testimony as to
the apparent presence of any disease, not in a scientific sense but as a state-
ment of a simple fact. The testimony, the court concluded, should not have
misled the jury; hence the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was re-
versed and that of the trial court affirmed.
In Prdgen v. Gibson,' an action for malpractice, the plaintiff alleged
that the loss of sight in his eyes was proximately caused by the defendant's
failure to use due care in the examination and treatment of the injured eye.
The trial court dismissed the action. Error was claimed in excluding testi-
mony by a general practitioner as an expert witness. The court held such
testimony admissible. Physicians and surgeons are experts in medicine and
surgery, and their opinions are admissible in evidence on questions strictly
embraced in their profession and practice, even though they are not special-
ists in the particular disease which is the subject of inquiry.
In the case of Hard v. Spokane Int'l Ry.,8 an action for personal injuries,
(Winter
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the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the question as to the competence of
the proposed expert must be determined in the first instance by the court
and should be settled before he is allowed to testify. The admissibility of
expert testimony is for the court; its weight is for the jury. If no objection
is made as to the witness' being qualified when such testimony is offered,
his competence as an expert cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Another case9 of interest was one in which testimony of autopsy find-
ings was offered by the examiner who was not a physician by degree or
license. An autopsy was performed at the direction of the county attorney.
The examiner was not a graduate of any medical school, nor was he licensed-
to practice medicine in Montana. He was a minister who "had practiced
medicine in practically all its phases" during seven years residence in the
state. He had studied medicine for thirty years on the theoretical side, had
medical books in his library, had visited hospitals, witnessed operations, at-
tended medical lectures and frequented dissecting rooms. He testified as to
the number and location of several gun-shot wounds and described with
great particularity the course of the bullets. After testifying that the
carotid artery and vagus nerve were the primary organs that were injured
by a bullet that entered the neck, he said that the vagus nerve is the
principal nerve controlling the heart and that injury to it would destroy the
functions of the heart. Later, however, when he was asked the effect of the
bullet wound in the neck, objection was made on the ground that he was
not qualified to answer. Similar objection was made when he was asked
whether two of the wounds might not have been made by the same bullet.
Both objections were overruled. In sustaining the action of the trial court
admitting the examiner's testimony, the Supreme Court of Montana said that
the question was whether the witness who is called on to testify has the
necessary experiential qualifications, regardless of how he came by them.
The general rule is that any question as to the possession of the required
qualifications by a particular witness is for the determination of the trial
court. A decision of that court will not be reversed unless manifestly er-
roneous as a matter of law. The Montana Supreme Court could not hold
that the trial court erred as a-matter of law in admitting this testimony.
It becomes obvious then that the responsibility for properly qualifying
the witness lies on the attorney's direct questioning. There should be specif-
ic questions concerning the pre-professional as well as professional train-
ing. Degrees and license dates should be stated but may not be sufficient
alone! ° The witness should be questioned as to interneships, residencies,
6125 Tex. 601, 83 S.W.2d 955 (1935).
T194 N.C. 289, 139 S.B. 443 (1927).841 Idaho 285, 238 Pac. 891 (1925).
9State v. Harkins, 85 Mont 585, 281 Pac. 551 (1929).
192 WIGMORE, EvIDBNcE S 569 (3d ed. 1940); 3 Id. 5 687.
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post-graduate courses, certifications by boards of specialists and awards and
affiliations with professional societies. It is desirable to elicit information
concerning the number of years of practice and the frequency of the par-
ticular type of case in question in the experience of the witness. Discretion
should be exercised to avoid giving the impression to the jury that there has
been emphasis on impractical specialization. The emphasis should be on the
training, experience and specialized knowledge of the subject to be offered
in evidence
An example of how overemphasis on specialization may have a detri-
mental effect is seen in the case of State v. Scruggs.11 The defendant was
convicted of murder. At the trial a medical doctor was on the stand as a
witness for the defendant. He qualified as an expert on roentgen-ray work.
The defendant sought to elicit his opinion as to whether a fracture of the
skull, such as was shown in the roentgenogram, could have resulted from
the deceased having fallen and struck her head on a pole or small log
offered in evidence. The judge refused to allow the witness to give his
opinion; the defendant contended that this was error. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana held that under the circumstances the trial judge's refusal was
proper, even though the witness claimed to be qualified to answer.
The evaluation of expert testimony, as of all testimony, is a problem for
the jury. In the case of Spencer v. Qauncy, 0. & K.C.R. Co., 2 an action to
recover damages for personal injuries, the following instruction was given
at the request of the plaintiff:
An expert witness is one who is skilled in any particular art, trade or
profession, being possessed of peculiar knowledge concerning the same ac-
quired by study, observation and practice. Expert testimony is the opinion
of such witness, based upon the facts in the case as shown by evidence, but
it does not even tend to prove any fact upon which it is based, and before
you can give any weight whatever to the opinion of the expert witnesses
you must first find from the evidence that the facts upon which it is based
are true. The jury is not bound by expert testimony, but it may be con-
sidered by you in connection with the other evidence in the case.
This instruction was taken bodily from Smth v. Telephone Co.'3 , wherein
it was unqualifiedly approved. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Miss-
ouri held it was erroneous, at least as applied to the evidence in this case.
There were several medical experts who testified with respect to the
plaintiff's injuries. They had made physical examinations, "read" roent-
gen-ray pictures and from both had diagnosed the condition of the injured
parts. The court said:
Their testimony consisted of a mixture of the facts they had observed
and the inferences they had drawn from those facts. Neither a skilled law-
yer nor a trained psychologist, much less a jury of laymen, could have
separated with any sort of precision the fact testimony of these experts from
their opinion testimony. The first part of the instruction could very prop-
WMter
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erly have been given if the experts' opinions had been based solely on
hypothetical facts; but the propriety of giving in any case the direction em-
bodied in the last sentence is extremely doubtful. The opinion of an expert,
when admissible at all, is evidence; sometimes it is the only evidence by
which proof can be made, and its value as evidence is always for the jury.
Besides, what reason can there be for singling out the testimony of experts
for comment and caution when their testimony must be considered and
weighed just like the testimony of other witnesses?"'
In the case of Lorrch v. Salvatton Army, Inc.,5 an action for personal
injuries and illness suffered while the plaintiff was a resident in one of the
defendanes homes, the plaintiff daimed that the defendant was negligent in
serving food contaminated with -typhoid bacilli, as a result of which he was
:rendered seriously ill. A physician testified that the typhoid carrier was
found to be an employee who assisted in the preparation of foods for the
home, and that it was his opinion that she probably contaminated food
served to the plaintiff. The defendant claimed the trial court erred in
instructing the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. It was held that
the expert testimony, although unrebutted, did not entitle the trial court to
direct a verdict since the members of the jury are the sole judges as to what
weight the opinion of the expert is entitled to receive. They should be
instructed to give such testimony just such weight as they deem it entitled to
receive.
Within the medical profession, where there is a reluctance to testify in
court, there are sometimes heard derogatory remarks concerning those who
testify frequently as expert witnesses. The attitude seems to be that such
men must be hard pressed financially to be coerced into this duty, or that
they are not ethical because such testimony may involve an implied criticism
of a fellow physician. Certainly this attitude is not conducive to assuring
the court of the most competent expert witnesses. The fact that there are
professional expert witnesses whose testimony may not be completely ob-
jective is recognized by the courts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
said:
The professional expert, whose testimony we relate above, frequently
appeared in court as a witness in personal injury cases, and the inference
from his evidence is that he made the giving of testimony in such actions
a business. One of the evils in the trial of personal injury cases is padding
the claim with evidence of the professional medical expert. When consid-
ering a motion for a new trial, based on an excessive verdict, ordinarily
but little weight should be given such tesumony'
' 165 La. 842, 116 So. 206 (1928).
" 317 Mo. 492, 297 S.W 353 (1927).
" 113 Mo. App. 443, 87 S.W. 71 (1905).
"*Spencer v. Quincy, 0. & K.C.R. Co., 317 Mo. 492, 503, 297 S.W 353, 357
(1927).
' 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947).
U Murphy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 292 Pa. 213, 216, 140 AtL 867, 869 (1927).
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How can this evil be remedied and the most competent and objective
testimony assured? To combat the sentiment that implied public criticism
of a fellow physician is unethical, a change in the basic dogmatic philosophy,
that infallibility must be maintained in the public eye, is necessary. Per-
haps the medical profession has dung to an outmoded protective attitude in
an era of cynicism. It should be said that there is a changing attitude in
some medical schools regarding this philosophy. The courts and the legal
profession have a responsibility in combating such a situation.
One of the greatest deterrents to medical expert testimony lies in the
inconvenience to the witness who, by being detained, has a busy schedule
upset. Suffering patients are kept waiting; as a result the physician must
often work long into the night to recapture lost tine. Seldom does it seem
that the time spent in court was worthwhile when weighed against the ser-
vice that could have been rendered at his usual duties. Time schedules are
difficult and at times impossible to work out during court procedures, but
every attempt should be made to insure against unnecessary detainment of
the busy practicing physician.
PRE-TRIL CONFmuE CE
Another very important method for improving the quality of expert
testimony, as well as for resolving misunderstandings and dissipating mis-
conceptions which exist between the lawyers and doctors, is to be found in
adequate preparation of the case. This should include pre-trial conferences
between the attorney and the physician. Pre-trial conferences should be
directed at more than merely eliciting perfunctory answers to questions
asked with preconceived objectives on the part of the attorney. Too often
the expert witness goes on the stand with knowledge that there are grounds
for honest disagreement with his opinions. If he feels a partisan loyalty
to the attorney who engaged his services and is dubious of that attorney's
ability to conduct re-direct questioning so as to refute any apparent dis-
crepancies brought out upon cross-examination, he will prove to be a poor
witness. He will invariably take upon himself the task of trying the case
by qualifying his answers, thereby furnishing more ammunition for the
cross-examiner. Such a witness feels that he is on trial and that his reputa-
tion as well as that of his profession is at stake; therefore, he ignores ob-
jectivity.
On the other hand a comprehensive pre-trial conference will produce
confidence on the part of the witness and the attorney. The attorney
should ask the witness if there are textbooks or recently published works
which substantiate his opinions. The attorney should have these on hand
to use if necessary on re-direct questioning. He should know also whether
or not there are contradictory opinions and on what basis the witness reached
the conclusions and tenets which he maintains. Any study of medical
[Winter
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literature by the attorney should be under the guidance of a physician, or
at least discussed with a physician. Certainly in the pre-trial conference
the expert should be acquainted with all the facts likely to be introduced in
evidence. The attitude of the patient who is examined by a physician with
the prospect of litigation may not be as objectively honest as that of the
patient who consults a physician solely for purpose of diagnosis. The
patient may withhold certain pertinent facts.
If the pre-trial conference is to serve the best interests of justice, the
physician and attorney must be completely honest with each other and
must objectively consider all the evidence and complexities. There are
some attorneys who "shop" around until they find a physician who will
give them the answer they think will best serve their interests. Usually
they do not give the physician all of the facts. The physician then finds
himself placed in an embarrassing situation when he takes the stand and
discovers the whole truth to be somewhat different from what he had been
led to believe. The honest physician who has been so embarrassed in court
takes a dim view thereafter of all attorneys and the duties of the expert
witness.
The pre-trial conference should also include indoctrination for the
expert witness. He should understand the legal restrictions and general
procedures of a trial. Such thorough pre-trial conferences would do much
to alleviate the estrangement of individuals in the medical and legal profes-
sions.
HyroTH'n cAL QUESTIONS
Physicians who testify as expert medical witnesses need to be i.ndoc-
trmnated in the rules governing hypothetical questions. If they do not
understand these rules, they may err in basing an opimon on facts not
incorporated in the hypothetical question.
The New York Court of Appeals has said:
We think it is not competent in any case to predicate a hypothetical
question to an expert upon-all of the evidence in the case, whether he has
heard it all or not, upon the assumption that he then recollects it, for it
would then be impossible for the jury to determine the facts upon which
the witness bases his opinion, and whether such facts were proved or not.
Suppose the jury concluded that certain facts are not-proved, how are they,
in such an event, to determine whether the opinion is not, to a great degree,.
based upon such facts? When specific facts, either proved or assumed to
have been proved, are embraced in the question, the jury are enabled to
determine whether the answer to such question is based upon facts which
have been proved in the case or not, and whether other facts.bearing upon
the correctness and force of the answer are contained therein, or have been
omitted from it, but in the absence of such a question the evidence must
always be, to a certain extent, uncertain, unintelligible, and perhaps, mis-7'
leadingY
'
TPeople v. McElvaine, 121 N.Y. 250, 258-259, 24 N.E. 465, 467 (1890).
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In the case of Carruthers v. Phillips,8 a medical witness called by the
plaintiff was asked to assume that in the course of an operaton for the sus-
pension of a prolapsed uterus the operating physician placed and left gauze
in the patient's bladder, and to state whether in so doing the physician ex-
ercised that degree of care and skill ordinarily used and exercised by physi-
cians in the practice of surgery in that locality and under those circum-
stances. The witness answered in the negative. The defendant contended
the question was improper because "it assumed as an absolute face' that
the operating physician had cut the bladder and placed gauze therein "when
the evidence along that line was dearly speculative and conjecturaL" The
Supreme Court of Oregon said:
It is the peculiar function of the hypothetical question to assume as an
absolute fact alleged conditions or events if supported by evidence and to
have an opinion based on the hypothesis. Plaintiff, in forming the hypo-
thetical question, should not leave to speculation the facts upon which the
opinion was to be based. If plaintiff asks a fair question based on sub-
stantal evidence, he may have the expert's opinion on any combination of
facts he may choose. He need not include in the question all the details
which appear in his own case and certainly cannot include the contradic-
tory matter in his opponent's case. He may lay before the jury by hypo-
thetical questions scientific inferences properly deducible from the facts
supported by his evidence. The form of such questions is generally within
the discretion of the trial court."
The court concluded accordingly that it was proper for the trial court
to permit the question propounded.
In Frank v. Herancourt Brew. Co.,20 the evidence tended to show that
the plaintiff, while employed by the defendant, was directed to varnish
beer cases. The varnish contained methyl alcohol. The plaintiff claimed
that the inhalation of these fumes caused his blindness. A physician testified
that the blindness was caused by the death of the optic nerve, which was the
natural result of inhalation of the methyl alcohol in the varnish. The de-
fendant objected to this testimony of the expert because his opinion was
not entirely predicated upon personal experience in the treatment of
similar cases. The court determined that the expert testimony need not
be based entirely upon personal experience. Knowledge gained from read-
ing books of science, from experience with lower animals and from scientific
investigation made along similar lines is a sufficient predicate for such
expert testimony.
Although it is legally permissible to choose facts in phrasing a hypo-
thetical question so that they conform to the questiomng party's theory,
it is bad practice to do so. Such questions are unfair to the witness who
' 169 Ore. 636, 131 P.2d 193 (1942).
" Id. at 644-645, 131 P.2d at 196.
"5 Ohio L. Rep. 559 (Cin. Super. Ct. 1907).
(Winter
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wants to be completely objective. And they will most certainly cause the
opposing attorney to retaliate with other hypothetical questions which may
include such evidence as to produce answers which will be damaging to the
case of the first attorney. Attorneys should expect the expert witness to be
completely honest and objective and should direct the questioning accord-
ingly.
TEXT BOOKS
In discussing the pre-trial conference it was said that the attorney should
be provided with references which will support the testimony of his expert
witness as well as those which may refute such testimony. It was also stated
that attorneys should consult with the expert witness on any conclusions
which he, the attorney, has drawn from reading such textbooks. This is
important when hypothetical questioning is formulated from reading such
literature and interpreted as the attorney believes it relates to his case. Per-
'haps it would be well here to review some of the rules governing the intro-
duction of textbooks in court procedures.
Textbooks cannot be introduced to impeach a witness unless he is
familiar with the writings or has stated that he based his opinion on such
authority, specifically naming the textbook. The reason is that the
author is not under oath and is not subject to the test of cross-examination.21
It is, however, proper to cross-examine an expert witness with reference
to data which form, in whole or in part, the basis of an opinion expressed
by him. When a particular authority had been relied on by the witness,
it is proper to test his knowledge and the accuracy of is deductions by
drawing his attention during cross-examination to the expressions of that
particular authority. This is not permitted for the purpose of using the
selected extracts as evidence but to enable the jury to weigh better the
testimony of the expert. 2
An example of improper questioning is seen in the case of State v. Sha-
hane.23 In cross-examination, the attorney for the State directed a question
to the expert, prefacing the question with "Now, doctor, isn't it a fact.
Counsel for the defendant objected on the ground that the State's attorney
was reading from a book, but the objection was overruled. The witness
answered "No, it is not a fact." Thereupon the States attorney asked:
"So, if such an authority as Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence states
that it is a fact, would you say that they are wrong?" An objection to this
'E.g., Commonwealth v. Tocdan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911); State v.
Brunette, 28 N.D. 539, 150 N.W. 271 (1914); 6 WIGMoRE, EvIDENcH S 1700 (3d
ed. 1940).
" Chezik v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 56 N.D. 553, 218 N.W 217 (1928).
=56 N.D. 642, 219 N.W 132 (1928).
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question was overruled. The doctor was not asked what medical books
he had read on the subject, or whether he had read Wharton & Stile. Coun-
sel for the defendant objected because the State's attorney revealed indirectly
to the jury the theory of Wharton & Stille as opposed to that of the
defendanes witness. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held the ob-
jection should have been sustained but that this testimony was not prejudi-
cial under the circumstances of the case. It is permissible to prepare
questions from medical books and to cross-examine a medical expert on
the theory of medical works on which he claims to base his opinion; but
it is not permissible to use medical books in opposition to medical expert
testimony given on the stand because authors are not available for cross-
examining.
An example of the use in cross-examination of a text cited by the wit-
ness is found in the case of Lews v. Johnson.24 An expert witness for the
defendant testified that the patient's leg was suspended in a "B6hler frac-
ture frame," that the witness had studied under Dr. Bdhler and used his
textbook, and that his, the witness' opinion, was in part based on the book.
The plaintiff's counsel then sought to cross-examine the witness by use of
Dr. B6hler's book. The trial court sustained an objection to the impeach-
ing questions. The Supreme Court of California held this was improper,
for the rule against such works as direct evidence is subject to the qualifica-
tion that textbooks relied upon by an expert witness may be used as a
foundation for impeaching cross-examination.
It is necessary that the expert witness state that he has deduced and based
his opinions from the book cited and in the light of his own experience. It
is not sufficient that he state that he concurs with the opinions of the
author.2
5
These rules may not hold true in less formal hearings, such as cases
before industrial commissions. For example, in the case of Nicotra v. Bige-
low, Sanford Carpet Co.,28 a doctor stated that he could not answer a particu-
lar question from personal experience and then read to the commissioner a
statement concerning the matter from a medical book. The employer con-
tended that it was error for the commissioner to receive the statement in
evidence, but the court held that this contention overlooks the nature of
the hearing before the commissioner. A statute27 provided that the com-
missioner shall not be bound by the ordinary common law or statutory
rules of evidence or procedures, and he is therefore permitted great latitude
in the admission of evidence. In another case,28 the plaintiff's objection
-12 Cal.2d 558, 86 P.2d 99 (1939).
'Thompson v. Ammons, 160 Ga. 886, 129 S.E. 539 (1925).
122 Conn. 353, 189 Ad. 603 (1937).
2CONN. RaV. GEN. STAT. § 7447 (1949).
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that the commission resorted to standard medical textbooks to form and
justify its conclusions as to the nature and likelihood of idiopathic tetanus
was held immaterial. "We are hardly in a position," said the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, "to supervise the acquisition or use by the commis-
sion of expert learning in various fields which call for administrative action
on its part" 2
9
Frequently a medical expert is called upon to state what therapy he would
have used in a certain hypothetical case. Since he must keep up.to-date,
he will answer in the light of the most recent knowledge on the subject. But
if the case in court had originated two years or more prior to the date of the
trial, it is conceivable that his course of treatment at the earlier date would
have been quite different. Too often on cross-examination an attorney
quotes a recognized authority from a text written so long ago that the
subject matter has been outdated.
Another frequently used tactic of the cross-examining attorney is to
question the medical expert on detailed information which he does not have
reason to keep fresh in his mind. Perhaps he hopes to discredit the expert
in the minds of the jury. A story which was told at a National Coroners'
Convention concerns such questions. A very able psychiatrist was on the
stand in California. The defense attorney intended to question him on
some detail of anatomy. He said: "Doctor, you studied human anatomy in
school Of course, you are familiar with anatomy?" The psychiatrist re-
plied: "I was!' The attorney asked hun to explain what he meant by his
answer in the past tense. Whereupon the witness replied: "There are
just two classes of individuals who know all about anatomy. One is the
professor in medical school, and the other is the student who just graduated
from the course. I am neither."
RECORDS
The most frequent source of exasperation to the attorney is the apparent
laxity many physicians seem to display in recording information which is
important as evidence in court trials. At the time the patient consults the
physician, the doctor is most interested in the medical details and often
disregards dates, the exact location of the accident, other persons involved
and matters that at the time seem irrelevant to him.
A highly successful medical witness whose records have always been
something to be proud of keeps on his desk a thirteen-point check list:
1. Dates are accurately entered. Every visit is dated, as is every telephone
call and conference.
Gmeiner & Grearson v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 1, 20 N.W.2d 543 (1945).
:Id. at 4, 20 N.W.2d at 545.
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2. The source of the patient is written down. If the lawyer sent the
patient to the office, that fact is entered.
3. The "how," "when" and "where" of the accident are completely ex-
plained.
4. Hospitalization data are obtained and entered in the history. Speci-
fically, the doctor includes (a) the name of the hospital; (b) hour
and date of admission and discharge; (c) whether sutures were in-
serted, and how many; (d) whether the patient was conscious, semi-
conscious, unconscious, drunk, sober, walking or not, when admitted.
The doctor includes this information in his record even though he can
testify only to those facts of which he has personal knowledge.
5. The patient's own words are used in writing the history and com-
plaints. For instance, if the patient says that last year she had an
operation on the "womb" or an attack of "Bright's disease," it is writ-
ten that way, and not as "hysterectomy" or "nephriris."
6. In all cases, no matter where the lesion is, five basic facts are recorded
among the findings. These are height, weight, blood pressure, pulse,
and the size and place of scars. Scars are measured preferably in
inches.
7 Findings of the examining physician are carefully separated from in-
formation acquired from other sources. If the word "anxiety," for
instance, appears in the examination, it must be so placed that it is
apparent whether the doctor found that the patient showed anxiety or
whether the patient said he suffered from anxiety.
8. Any items not in the doctor's handwriting are initialed by him. If
the nurse took height and weight, the physician cannot testify that on
that date the patient weighed so much; but if he can honestly say that
the weight was taken at his request and under his supervision, he may
testify about it. The doctor's initials serve to corrobate his statement.
9. The findings of a radiologist are entered in the record after the doctor
has reviewed the films and confirmed the report. The doctor is then
able to testify about his own interpretation of the x-ray.
10. The originals of all laboratory reports are kept in the file. The date on
which such procedures were ordered is indicated in the doctor's hand-
writing, as well as the date on which the report was received and an
abstract of the findings.
11. The financial data are either copied on the clinical record or, if sepa-
rately kept, removed and attached to the record when it is brought
to court. This includes bills sent and fees received, with dates, and
a note of who actually paid the fees.
12. A carbon copy is retained of every record, report and letter sent out.
There are no exceptions to this rule. If a report is filled out on a
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form, the questions as well as the answers are entered on the carbon
copy; the secretary should type the questions on the carbon copy.
13. At least once on the record, and more often if the patient is seen for
a long period, a note is entered as to the extent of the disability. The
disability should be judged by six indices: (a) How much does it
impair earning capacity? (b) How much does it impair vocational
efficiency? (c) How much does it impair employability, that is, the
patient's chance of getting a new job with this defect? (d) What is the
functional (physiologic) loss? (e) Is there any cosmetic defect?
(f) Do the emotional effects of the accident cause any disability?3°
If the examination of the patient was not complete, the doctor should
not be trapped into saying that it was. For example, the lawyer may ask the
doctor how he tested the sense of smell. If he acknowledges that he did
not do so, the lawyer may point out that smell functions through the first
cranial nerve, and "do you mean to tell me that you didn't examine even the
first cranial nerve?" Such a question is nonsense, but the doctor may not
have the chance to show why. The best practice is to say that he made
as complete an examination as the condition warranted.
The doctor should bring his records to court. If he does not have them,
the jury may think that he doesn't keep records or that the records would
contradict his testimony.
When the doctor refers to his records, he should say that he is "refresh-
ing his recollection." That phrase is important. If he says he is reading
from his records, the testimony may be thrown out of court, since the
theory is that a witness testifies about what he knows and remembers. The
court assumes that the doctor sees many patients and that he cannot remem-
ber details about all. But as he looks at his record, he does remember. The
carbon copy of his report to the lawyer is often the best springboard for
the doctor's testimony.
If records are brought into court and referred to by the witness to re-
fresh his memory, they need not be the original records.81 However, if
nothing will serve to refresh the doctor's memory, then his records may be
offered in evidence. But in this latter situation they must be the originals
and other conditions must also be met8
2
RuLEs OF CONDUCT
Most of the foregoing has been directed to attorneys and physicians.
The follownig comments are directed to physicians as suggestions for
their appearance in court:
10 MmICAL ECONOMICS 66-67 (March, 1947).
m3 WIGMORE, EVDmENCE § 760 (3d ed. 1940).
'3 d. § 749.
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Dress, appearance and bearing are all under the observation of the jury.
Quiet dignity, confidence and humility should be displayed.
Notify the court attendant that you have arrived and ask him to pass
the information along to the counsel table.
Be scrupulously honest in testimony.
Do not argue.
Do not talk too much.
If you do not understand a question, or do not know the answer, say so.
Do not answer hostile counsel too quickly; give your lawyer a chance
to object.
Combat the temptation to use technical terms. "I found a cut an inch
long" is more effective than "Examination revealed a laceration 2.5 cm. in
length." Many doctors cling to the idea that technical terms impress the
jury, but actually most juries resent them.
Do not be partisan in attitude.
Do not try the case; let the attorney do that. If an honest answer to a
question by the attorney for the opposite side seems to you to be damaging
to the side on which you are testifying, do not hedge but give the honest,
concise answer and trust your attorney to bring out the proper application
for this case. This requires that the attorney have previous knowledge of
such a possibility, and therefore there must be a pre-trial conference between
the attorney and the medical expert.
Be convincing but do not be prejudiced or belligerent.
In conclusion it is hoped that this discussion in which the attorney and
the physician can be indoctrinated in each other's problems will eventually
result in the development of a plan for the choice of procuring and putting
before the judge and the jury proper medical expert testimony which will
be impartial and based on a complete analysis of all the medical facts per-
tamining to a particular case. This type of plan can be developed through
the cooperation of the court, the bar and the medical associations, and
through this means expert medical testimony can be placed on a firm founda-
tion.
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